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in their frequency, and in the publication lag of established series can do 
as much to facilitate forecasting as the development and publication of new 
series. Secondly, there is in fact a good deal of information available 
about the Scottish economy in addition to those data published in official 
sources like the Scottish Economic Bulletin and the Scottish Abstract of 
Statistics. This includes information collected by trade associations, 
nationalised industries and government departments, which may not be 
published but which are available. There is therefore an important task 
in the systematic identification, processing and storage of available data 
series, and this presently constitutes a major part of our research time. 
Simultaneously, starting with a simple form of model structure based on an 
output-income accounting system, we are attempting to specify equations 
consistent with this structure and with the available data series. Two 
important criteria in this concern the disaggregation of flows by sector 
and by sub-region, though it is a \/ery long way indeed to the construction 
of any kind of intra-regional model structure. 
3. General Review 
World events and prospects from January 1974 
Events in the world economy since January 1974 have been dominated by the 
rise in the price of oil and other primary commodities which took place in 
1973. The experience of almost ewery economy in the world since then has 
been characterised by adjustment to these events. When the quadrupling of 
the oil price took place at the end of 1973 it was widely believed that this 
would bring about an international monetary crisis, in consequence of huge 
trade surpluses being realised by the OPEC countries and corresponding 
deficits by the industrialised (OECD) countries. In fact, the very rapid 
rate of growth of imports of goods and services by OPEC countries coupled 
with a sharp decline in the demand for oil by the industrialised countries 
has led to a situation which the "petrodollar" surplus has been much less 
than had been feared. It is expected that by the end of 1975 the OECD 
countries taken together will have a collective balance of payments surplus 
on current account. World monetary institutions have shown themselves 
capable of coping with the problem of "re-cycling". 
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While international financial adjustments have taken place without much 
difficulty, the same cannot be said for the domestic adjustment of real 
resources within the industrialised countries. The reaction to the sudden 
unfavourable shift in the terms of trade did not take the form of a smooth 
switch from consumption to exports but also led to a fall in output and 
employment. With the exception of the United Kingdom (see later section) 
most of the industrialised countries responded with domestic deflationary 
measures which exacerbated the external pressures leading to unemployment. 
Their object in doing so was to offset any tendency for their domestic costs 
to increase and to maintain their competitive external position in order to 
switch resources from domestic consumption to exports. An examination of 
the path of real GNP in the major industrialised countries shows in the 
second half of this year the same pattern of a dip in mid-1974 followed by 
an expected recovery. Output in the OECD countries appears therefore to 
be moving on an upward course, although unemployment is increasing and is 
expected to go on increasing. 
World trade 
As a result of the quadrupling of oil prices the growth of trade in and 
between the OECD countries grew by less than 5$ in 1974, while exports from 
the OECD to the OPEC countries increased by 45% - 50% in volume terms. 
Unless there is an equally sudden fall in the price of oil, the imports of 
the OPEC countries may be expected to continue to increase and provide the 
stimulus for much of the growth of exports in the OECD countries over the 
next two years at least. It should be marked that one of the favourable 
factors leading to a satisfactory readjustment in world trade has been the 
sharp reduction in imports by the OECD countries which has accompanied their 
equally substantial increase in exports to the OPEC countries. 
United Kingdom 
The reaction of the United Kingdom to the external events has been almost 
unique amongst industrialised countries. So far from deflating, as most 
other countries have done, the Government has actually continued to inflate 
the level of aggregate domestic demand. This has of course merely postponed 
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the painful adjustment which other countries have put behind them. The 
postponement of the readjustment has been made possible by heavy external 
borrowing. From the beginning of 1973 to the end of 1974 it is estimated 
that the increase in external short term liabilities of the banking system 
and public sector borrowing required to finance the cumulative deficit on 
current and investment accounts amounts to over £3,500 million. 
While the necessary readjustment has been postponed of course it cannot be 
avoided. That this is so is shown by the growing contrast between trends 
in price levels in the United Kingdom on the one hand and the rest of the 
major industrialised countries on the other hand. In the first quarter of 
1975 the rise in UK consumer prices accelerated to over 6% whereas for the 
whole of the OECD countries the rise in the same period was only about 3J%. 
It seems clear that the competitive position of the United Kingdom will 
deteriorate markedly unless the £ is allowed to depreciate further, which in 
any case will merely postpone the required adjustment, i.e. a fall in real 
consumption. Moreover, the longer effective action is postponed, the more 
likely it is that its timing and content will be determined by considerations 
of foreign confidence. 
The measures canvassed fall into two broad schools of thought (excluding 
the "seige economy" proponents). They are (a) the traditional methods of 
restriction of the aggregate money supply together with net reductions in 
public expenditure and (b) methods of direct control of wages (and perhaps 
prices). Both these sets of measures have been applied - separately and in 
combination - at various periods in the last fifteen years without marked 
success. (Proponents of both schools would argue that their measures should 
have been implemented more vigourously). 
In the last few days the Chancellor has announced measures to control the 
level of money wage increases (and maintain existing controls on prices). 
Whatever the final details of the package, the target set for wages falls 
short of expected price increases during the next year and must inevitably 
produce the fall in real consumption already experienced in the other 
industrial countries, who are now beginning to reflate domestic demand. 
Although details are not yet clear, references to cash limits in the public 
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sector may also imply further cuts in real net public expenditure and thus 
add to the decline in aggregate demand resulting from the planned reduction 
in real wages. 
The content of these measures can come as little surprise. It is perhaps 
appropriate to speculate whether the substantial cost of maintaining a lower 
unemployment rate than other OECD countries since last year, against a sharp 
decline in the UK's competitive position, and the certainty of higher 
unemployment this winter, can be justified. By delaying remedial action 
the UK has moved out of step with other member countries and may well remain 
out of step when the expected recovery in world trade gets under way next 
year. Early re-expansion of the UK economy to take advantage of such a 
recovery is now not only unlikely because of lags in response to policy 
changes, but severely constrained by the need to reduce the accumulated 
public sector and external borrowing requirements. A return to the cycle 
of slow growth and financial probity experienced in 1968-70 is therefore 
likely, though the growth may be slower and the probity more severe. 
